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We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal
monetary stabilization policy. Prices are fully ￿ exible and money is essential for trade.
Our main result is that if the central bank pursues a price-level target, it can control
in￿ ation expectations and improve welfare by stabilizing short-run shocks to the econ-
omy. The optimal policy involves smoothing nominal interest rates which e⁄ectively
smooths consumption across states.
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11 Introduction
A key objective of modern central banking is to keep in￿ ation low and stable over some ￿ long￿
time horizon. However, central banks are also concerned with stabilizing the real economy in
the ￿ short￿run. Balancing these two objectives is a complex policy task for central bankers
and thus there is an obvious need for economic models to guide central bankers in making
informed policy choices.
After a long period of inactivity, the last decade has seen a tremendous resurgence of
research focusing on how to conduct stabilization policy in the face of temporary shocks
when there is a desire to keep in￿ ation low and stable in the long-run. Nearly all of this
work has come from the New Keynesian literature which, in the tradition of real business
cycle models, constructs dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models to study optimal
stabilization policy. What separates New Keynesian (NK) models from real business cycle
models is their reliance on nominal rigidities, such as price or wage stickiness, that allows
monetary policy to have real e⁄ects. A key policy recommendation coming out of NK models
is that ￿good￿ monetary policy requires guiding in￿ ation expectations in an appropriate
manner.1 In order to do so, it is often advocated that the central bank adopt some version
of a price-level target or an in￿ ation target. It is still an open question as to which one is
the better targeting approach.
NK models typically are ￿ cashless￿in the sense that there are no monetary trading fric-
tions. Instead, the driving friction is some type of nominal rigidity but there has been
considerable debate as to what nominal object should be rigid (output price, input price or
nominal wage) as well as how the rigidity occurs (Calvo, Taylor, menu cost).
In this paper, we sidestep the debate over nominal rigidity and take the opposite approach
￿we study stabilization policy in a model where all prices are ￿ exible but there are trading
frictions that money overcomes.2 We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
1See, for example, Woodford (2003) Chapters 1 and 7. Also see Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) p. 1663.
2The frictions that make money essential are information frictions regarding individual trading histories,
public communication frictions of individual trading outcomes and lack of enforcement. Note that these
2model where money is essential for trade.3 There are shocks to preferences and technology
that combined with the monetary friction, give rise to welfare improving interventions by
the central bank. The existence of a credit sector generates a nominal interest rate that the
monetary authority manipulates in its attempt to stabilize these shocks.
We demonstrate that the critical element for e⁄ective stabilization policy is the central
bank￿ s control of long-run in￿ ation expectations via price level targeting. By doing so mon-
etary policy has real e⁄ects even though prices are fully ￿ exible ￿a prescription similar to
that of NK models. Whereas, managing in￿ ation expectations makes a central bank￿ s sta-
bilization response to aggregate shocks more e⁄ective in the NK models, our model makes
a much stronger case for managing expectations ￿failure to do so makes stabilization pol-
icy completely neutral. Thus, the idea that the central bank needs to ￿ manage in￿ ation
expectations￿is good advice regardless of whether or not there are nominal rigidities in the
economy.
Stabilization policy in our model works through a liquidity e⁄ect. By injecting money
the central bank lowers nominal interest rates, stimulating borrowing, which leads to higher
consumption and production even though prices are perfectly ￿ exible. This works without
causing current in￿ ation because the central bank commits to undo any current monetary
injections at some future date to bring prices back to the long-run price path. By returning
to the announced price path at a speci￿ed date, the central bank pins down the real value
of money at that date. In our model, there are agents who sell goods today for cash, which
is used for future spending and consumption. By working backwards, sellers today know
that the current injection has no future in￿ ation implications and any money received today
has a certain value in the future. Hence, sellers do not adjust their prices one-for-one with
the injections of cash today. As a result, real balances increase as does consumption and
production. The characteristic feature of the optimal stabilization policy under price-level
frictions have nothing to do with particular goods, locations, individuals or pricing protocols. Nor does it
imply that money saves ￿ time￿as in a shopping time model.
3By essential we mean that the use of money expands the set of allocations (Kocherlakota (1998) and
Wallace (2001)).
3targeting is the smoothing of nominal interest rates and consumption across states.
It is critical that the central bank can commit itself to a price-level path and unravel
these current injections at a future date. If sellers perceive the injections are permanent,
then they anticipate (correctly) that current injections will lead to higher future prices and
will raise their current prices one-for-one with the injections. This leaves the real value of
money unchanged and there are no real e⁄ects from the injections.
We think this is a relevant story for the situation facing the Federal Reserve after the
￿nancial crisis of 2008. During 2009, the Fed doubled the size of its balance sheet and
the stock of money outstanding. Despite these large injections of liquidity into the system,
in￿ ation expectations did not appear to change. One explanation for this is that agents
believed this massive injection of liquidity was temporary and the Fed would take actions to
undo them at a future date. As a result, ￿rms did not increase their prices and the real value
of money increased, which presumably had some real e⁄ect. At the same time, many stories
circulated that markets were concerned the Fed would not unwind these monetary injections
in a timely fashion and thus in￿ ation could take o⁄. The Fed undertook great pains to
convince markets that they could unwind these injections when needed. This description of
the monetary policy events of 2009 are perfectly consistent with the policy predictions in
our model.
While stabilization policy has been widely studied in NK models, to our knowledge,
we are the ￿rst to study it in a modern, micro-founded model with ￿ exible prices. There
are other models with ￿ exible prices and liquidity e⁄ects, such as Fuerst (1992), but in
those models only a subset of agents receive injections of cash (borrowers) whereas in our
model, all agents receive injections. This is not a small di⁄erence ￿models in which agents
receive di⁄erential amounts of money transfers will clearly have real e⁄ects since there is
a redistribution of resources across agents. We do not employ this redistribution channel
in our environment, yet we still get real e⁄ects from monetary injections because of the
central bank￿ s commitment to a price level path. Finally, most of the research using the
4Fuerst model studies the impact of unexpected innovations of the money supply on nominal
interest rates and real variables. These researchers do not study optimal stabilization policy.
In our model, the central bank fully reveals its state-contingent plan of interventions (and
reversals), so agents are not being ￿ surprised￿by policy innovations.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the environment. In Section
3 agents￿optimization problems are presented and in Section 4 we derive the ￿rst-best
allocation. In Section 5 we present the central bank￿ s stabilization problem and derive
the policy response to shocks. Section 6 contains discussion of the results and Section 7
concludes.
2 The Environment
The basic environment is that of Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2007) which builds on
Lagos and Wright (2005). We use the Lagos-Wright framework because it provides a mi-
crofoundation for money demand and it allows us to introduce heterogenous preferences for
consumption and production while keeping the distribution of money balances analytically
tractable. Time is discrete and in each period there are three perfectly competitive markets
that open sequentially.4 Market 1 is a credit market while markets 2 and 3 are goods mar-
kets. There is a [0;1] continuum of in￿nitely-lived agents and one perishable good produced
and consumed by all agents.
At the beginning of the period agents receive a preference shock such that they either
consume, produce or neither in the second market. With probability n an agent consumes,
with probability s he produces and with probability 1 ￿ n ￿ s he does neither. We refer to
consumers as buyers and producers as sellers.
In the second market buyers get utility "u(q) from q > 0 consumption, where " is a
preference parameter and u0(q) > 0, u00(q) < 0, u0(0) = +1 and u0(1) = 0. Furthermore,
4Competitive pricing in the Lagos-Wright framework is a feature in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and
Berentsen, Camera, and Waller (2005).
5we impose that the elasticity of utility e(q) =
qu0(q)
u(q) is bounded. Producers incur utility cost
c(q)=￿ from producing q units of output where ￿ is a measure of productivity. We assume
that c0 (q) > 0, c00 (q) ￿ 0 and c0 (0) = 0.
Following Lagos and Wright (2005) we assume that in the third market all agents con-
sume and produce, getting utility U(x) from x consumption, with U0(x) > 0, U0(0) = 1,
U0(+1) = 0 and U00(x) ￿ 0.5 Agents can produce one unit of the consumption good with
one unit of labor which generates one unit of disutility. The discount factor across dates is
￿ = (1 + ￿)
￿1 2 (0;1) where ￿ is the time rate of discount.
Information frictions, money and credit To motivate a role for ￿at money, in market
2, our preference structure creates a single-coincidence problem in which buyers do not have a
good desired by sellers. In addition to this single coincidence of wants problem the following
frictions are assumed. First, as in Kocherlakota (1998), due to a lack of record-keeping,
trading histories of agents in the goods markets are private information, which rules out
trade credit between individual buyers and sellers. This implies agents are ￿ anonymous￿
to each other. Second, there is no public communication of individual trading outcomes
(public memory), which in turn eliminates the use of social punishments to support gift-
giving equilibria. The combination of these two frictions and the single coincidence problem,
implies that sellers require immediate compensation from buyers. In short there must be
immediate settlement with some durable asset and money is the only durable asset in our
economy. So, buyers must use money to acquire goods in market 2. These are the micro-
founded frictions that make money essential for trade. In market 3 agents can produce for
their own consumption or use money balances acquired earlier. In this market, money is not
essential for trade.6
The ￿rst market is a credit market. Almost by de￿nition, credit requires record-keeping
5As in Lagos and Wright (2005), these assumptions allow us to get a degenerate distribution of money
holdings at the beginning of a period. The di⁄erent utility functions U (:) and u(:) allow us to impose
technical conditions such that in equilibrium all agents produce and consume in the last market.
6One can think of agents being able to barter perfectly in this market. Obviously is such an environment,
money is not needed.
6over private trading histories and non-anonymous transactions. It is exactly this tension
that makes it di¢ cult to have money and credit coexist in microfounded models. Thus
we follow Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007) and assume that a limited record-keeping
technology exists in market 1 that can keep track of trading histories involving exchanges of
one particular object ￿money. This limited record-keeping technology is similar to an ATM
machine ￿agents can identify themselves to the ATM machine and either borrow or deposit
cash. Agents cannot borrow or deposit goods at the ATM. These cash transactions can be
recorded and interest is charged to borrowers and paid to depositors. Thus, while there is
record-keeping of trading histories over these cash transactions, the ATM machine has no
idea what a borrower does with the cash ￿there is no record of how the cash is used for
buying goods.
We assume that any funds borrowed or lent in market 1 are repaid in market 3. The
nominal interest rate on these loans is denoted by i. Given the discrete time aspect of the
model, loans are technically ￿ intraperiod￿loans but in reality they can be thought of as an
inter-period loan. For example, consider a loan taken out at 23:59 on December 31 or one
taken out at 00:01 on January 1 with both being repaid the following December 31. The ￿rst
is an ￿ inter-period￿loan and the latter is an ￿ intraperiod￿loan. While technically di⁄erent,
there is no serious economic di⁄erences between the two loans. Thus, our intraperiod loans
should be thought of this way ￿funds are borrowed early in the period and repaid late in
the period.
One can show that due to the quasi-linearity of preferences in market 3 there is no gain
from multi-period contracts. Furthermore, since the aggregate states are revealed prior to
contracting, the one-period nominal debt contracts that we consider are optimal. Finally
in all models with credit, default is a serious issue. To focus on optimal stabilization, we
simplify the analysis by assuming a mechanism exists that ensures repayment of loans in the
third market.7
7One possibility would be that agents require a particular ￿ tool￿to be able to consume in market 2. This
tool can then be used as collateral against loans in market 1 so that for su¢ ciently high discount factors
72.1 Shocks
To study the optimal response to shocks, we assume that n, s, ￿ and " are stochastic. The
random variable n has support [n;n] 2 (0;1=2], s has support [s;s] 2 (0;1=2], ￿ has support
[￿;￿], 0 < ￿ < ￿ < 1, and " has support [";"], 0 < " < " < 1. Let ! = (n;s;￿;") 2 ￿
be the aggregate state in market 1, where ￿ = [n;n] ￿ [s;s] ￿ [￿;￿] ￿ [";"] is a closed and
compact subset on R
4
+. The shocks are serially uncorrelated. Let f (!) denote the density
function of !.
Shocks to n and " are thought of as aggregate demand shocks, while shocks to s and
￿ are aggregate supply shocks. We call shocks to " and ￿ intensive margin shocks since
they change the desired consumption of each buyer and the productivity of each seller,
respectively, without a⁄ecting the number of buyers or sellers. In contrast, shocks to n and
s a⁄ect the number of buyers and sellers. Although we call these aggregate shocks, there
are actually sectoral shocks since they do not a⁄ect demand or productivity in the third
market. Nevertheless, as we see below, output in market 3 is constant so any volatility in
total output per period is driven by shocks in market 2.
2.2 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy has a long and short-run component. The long-run component focuses
on the trend in￿ ation rate. The short-run component is concerned with the stabilization
response to aggregate shocks.
We assume a central bank exists that controls the supply of ￿at currency. We denote the
gross growth rate of the money supply by ￿ = Mt=Mt￿1 where Mt denotes the per capita
money stock in market 3 in period t. The central bank implements its long-term in￿ ation
goal by providing deterministic lump-sum injections of money, ￿Mt￿1, at the beginning of
the period. These transfers are given to the private agents. The net change in the aggregate
repayment occurs with probability one.
In Berentsen et al. (2007) we derive the equilibrium when the only punishment for strategic default is
exclusion from the ￿nancial system in all future periods.
8money stock is given by ￿Mt￿1 = (￿￿1)Mt￿1. If ￿ > 1, agents receive lump-sum transfers of
money. For ￿ < 1, the central bank must be able to extract money via lump-sum taxes from
the economy. For notational ease variables corresponding to the next period are indexed
by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous period are indexed by ￿1. There is an
initial money stock M0 > 0.
Throughout this paper, we will assume that ￿ determines the long-run desired in￿ ation
rate and that, for unspeci￿ed reasons, ￿ > ￿, i.e., the central bank does not run the Fried-
man rule. The inability to run the Friedman rule may occur in environments with limited
enforcement. In such environments all trades must be voluntary and so lump-sum taxes of
money are impossible because the central bank cannot impose any penalties on the agents
(see Kocherlakota 2001).8 On the other hand, the central bank might not choose to run
the Friedman rule because it is not the optimal policy. For example, the Friedman rule can
be suboptimal in models that display matching externalities (see Berentsen, Rocheteau and
Shi (2007), Rocheteau and Wright (2005)). Another reason the central bank might be con-
strained from implementing the Friedman rule is that there are seigniorage needs implying
￿ > 1. Since our focus is stabilization policy we have not explicitly modeled reasons that
give rise to deviations from the Friedman rule. However, we think doing so is an interesting
research question to pursue and have done so in a related paper (Berentsen and Waller 2008).
The central bank implements its short-term stabilization policy through state contingent
changes in the stock of money. Let ￿1 (!)M￿1 and ￿3 (!)M￿1 denote the state contingent
cash injections in markets 1 and 3 received by private agents. Note that total injections at
the beginning of the period are T = [￿ + ￿1 (!)]M￿1. We assume that ￿1 (!)+￿3 (!) = 0. In
short, any injections in market 1 are undone in market 3. This e⁄ectively means that the long-
term in￿ ation rate is still deterministic since ￿M￿1 is not state dependent. Consequently,
8There is a di⁄erence between lump-sum taxation and loan repayment. Voluntary loan repayment can be
supported with reputational strategies (see for example Berentsen, Camera, and Waller 2007). The reason
is that default results in exclusion from ￿nancial markets and the loss of future bene￿ts. In contrast, taxes
typically ￿nance public goods for which exclusion is not possible thus taxes must necessarily be forced on
individual agents by society.
9changes in ￿1 (!) a⁄ect the money stock in market 2 without a⁄ecting the long-term in￿ ation
rate in market 3.9 With ￿1 (!) + ￿3 (!) = 0 we are implicitly assuming the central bank
chooses a path for the money stock in market 3. As we show later, this means the central
bank is engaged in price level targeting (in terms of market 3 prices) which allows the central
bank to control price expectations in market 3, which is critical for successful stabilization
policy. An interesting implication of the optimal policy is that the central bank is essentially
providing an elastic supply of currency ￿when demand for liquidity is high, it provides
additional currency and withdraws it when the demand for liquidity is low.
The state contingent injections of cash should be viewed as a type of repurchase agreement
￿the central bank ￿ sells￿money in market 1 under the agreement that it is being repurchased
in market 3. Alternatively, ￿1 (!)M￿1 can be thought of as a zero interest discount loan
to households that is repaid in the night market. If ￿1 (!) < 0, agents would be required
to lend to the central bank at zero interest. Since they can earn interest by lending in the
credit market it is obvious that agents would never lend money to the central bank. Thus,
￿1 (!) < 0 is not feasible and so ￿1 (!) ￿ 0 in all states.10 Finally, to ensure repayment of
loans we assume the central bank has the same record-keeping and enforcement technologies
as in the credit market. Thus, the only di⁄erence between the central bank and the credit
market is the ability of the central bank to print ￿at currency.
The precise sequence of action after the shocks are observed is as follows. First, the
monetary injection ￿M￿1 occurs and the central bank o⁄ers up to ￿1 (!)M￿1 units of cash
per capita to agents at no cost. Then, agents move to the credit market where non-buyers
lend their idle cash and buyers borrow money. Agents then move on to market 2 and trade
goods. In the third market agents trade goods once again, all ￿nancial claims are settled
and the central bank takes out ￿3 (!)M￿1 = ￿￿1 (!)M￿1 units of money.
9Lucas (1990) employs a similar process for the money supply so that changes in nominal interest rates
result purely from liquidity e⁄ects and not changes in expected in￿ ation.
10Woodford (2003) p. 75, footnote 9, makes a similar argument.
103 First-best Allocation
In a stationary equilibrium the expected lifetime utility of the representative agent at the
beginning of period t is given by
(1 ￿ ￿)W = U (x) ￿ x +
Z
￿
fn"u[q (!)] ￿ (s=￿)c[(n=s)q (!)]gf (!)d!:
The ￿rst-best allocation satis￿es
U
0 (x
￿) = 1 and (1)
￿"u
0 [q
￿ (!)] = c
0 [(n=s)q
￿ (!)] for all !: (2)
These are the quantities chosen by a social planner who could force agents to produce and
consume.
4 Monetary Economy
We now study the allocation arising in the monetary economy. In what follows, we look at
a representative period t and work backwards from the third to the ￿rst market to examine
the agents￿choices.
4.1 The third market
In the third market agents consume x, produce h, and adjust their money balances taking
into account cash payments or receipts from the credit market. If an agent has borrowed l
units of money, then he repays (1 + i)l units of money.
Consider a stationary equilibrium. Let V1(m;t) denote the expected lifetime utility at
the beginning of market 1 with m money balances prior to the realization of the aggregate
state !. Let V3 (m;l;!;t) denote the expected lifetime utility from entering market 3 with m
11units of money and net borrowing l when the aggregate state is ! in period t. For notational
simplicity we suppress the dependence of the value functions on the aggregate state and
time.
The representative agent￿ s program is
V3 (m;l) = max
x;h;m+1
[U (x) ￿ h + ￿V1;+1 (m+1)] (3)
s.t. x + ￿m+1 = h + ￿(m + ￿3M￿1) ￿ ￿(1 + i)l;
where m+1 is the money taken into period t + 1. Rewriting the budget constraint in terms
of h and substituting into (3) yields
V3 (m;l) = ￿[m + ￿3M￿1 ￿ (1 + i)l]
+max
x;m+1
[U (x) ￿ x ￿ ￿m+1 + ￿V1 (m+1)]:
The ￿rst-order conditions are U0 (x) = 1 and
￿￿￿1 + ￿V
m
1 = 0; (4)
where the superscript denotes the partial derivative with respect to the argument m. Note
that the ￿rst-order condition for money has been lagged one period. Thus, V m
1 is the
marginal value of taking an additional unit of money into the ￿rst market in period t. Since
the marginal disutility of working is one, ￿￿￿1 is the utility cost of acquiring one unit of
money in the third market of period t ￿ 1.





3 = ￿￿(1 + i): (5)
As in Lagos and Wright (2005) the value function is linear in wealth. The implication is that
12all agents enter the following period with the same amount of money.
4.2 The second market
At the beginning of the second market there are three trading types: buyers (b), sellers (s)
and others (o). Accordingly, let V2j(m;l) denote the expected lifetime utility of an agent of
trading type j = b;s;o. Let qb and qs, respectively, denote the quantities consumed by a
buyer and produced by a seller and let p2 be the nominal price of goods in market 2. Since
j = o agents are inactive in this market we have V2o(m;l) = V3(m;l).
A seller who holds m money and l loans at the opening of the second market has expected
lifetime utility
V2s(m;l) = ￿c(qs)=￿ + V3(m + p2qs;l);
where qs = argmaxqs [￿c(qs)=￿ + V3(m + pqs;l)]. Using (5), the ￿rst-order condition re-
duces to
c
0 (qs) = ￿p2￿ = ￿p2=p3; ! 2 ￿: (6)
Sellers decide whether to produce for a unit of money in market 2 or in market 3. As a
result, they compare the productivity cost of producing and acquiring a unit of money in
market 2 to the relative cost of producing and acquiring a unit of money in market 3. Thus,
the supply of goods in market 2 is driven by the relative cost of acquiring money across the
two markets.
A buyer who has m money and l loans at the opening of the second market has expected
lifetime utility
V2b(m;l) = "u(qb) + V3(m ￿ p2qb;l);
where qb = argmaxqb "u(qb) + V3(m ￿ pqb;l) s.t. pqb ￿ m. Using (5) and (6) the buyer￿ s
￿rst-order condition can be written as
￿q = ￿[￿"u
0 (qb)=c
0 (qs) ￿ 1]; ! 2 ￿; (7)
13where ￿q = ￿q (!) is the multiplier on the buyer￿ s budget constraint in state !. If the budget
constraint is not binding, then ￿"u0(qb) = c0 (qs), which means trades are e¢ cient. If it is
binding, then ￿"u0(qb) > c0 (qs) which means trades are ine¢ cient. In this case the buyer
spends all of his money, i.e. p2qb = m.




2j = ￿(1 + i)￿; (8)
for j = b;s;o. Using the envelope theorem and equations (5) and (7), the marginal values










2o = ￿: (10)
4.3 The ￿rst market




[nV2b (mb;lb) + sV2s (ms;ls) + (1 ￿ n ￿ s)V2o (mo;lo)]f (!)d!; (11)




V2j (mj;lj) s.t. 0 ￿ mj:





2j + ￿j = 0; ! 2 ￿;
where ￿j = ￿j (!) is the multiplier on the agent￿ s non-negativity constraint in state !. It is
straightforward to show that buyers will become net borrowers while the others become net
14lenders. Consequently, we have ￿b = 0 and ￿s = ￿o > 0.
Using (8)-(10), the ￿rst-order conditions for j = b and for j = s;o can be written as
￿"u
0 (qb) = c
0 (qs)(1 + i); ! 2 ￿; (12)
￿s = ￿o = i￿; ! 2 ￿: (13)
Note that if i = 0, trades are e¢ cient and if i > 0, they are ine¢ cient.









0 (qs)]f (!)d!: (14)
Di⁄erentiating (14) shows that the value function is concave in m.
4.4 Stationary Equilibrium
In period t, let p3 denote the nominal price of goods in market 3. It then follows that
￿ = 1=p3 is the real price of money. We study equilibria where end-of-period real money
balances are time and state invariant
￿M = ￿￿1M￿1 = ￿0M0 ￿ z; ! 2 ￿: (15)
We refer to it as a stationary equilibrium. This implies that ￿ is not state dependent and
so ￿￿1=￿ = p3=p3;￿1 = M=M￿1 = ￿. This e⁄ectively means that the central bank chooses a
price path p3 = ￿p3;￿1 in market 3. Since ￿ is a jump variable and the only state variable
that matters in market 3 is M we can start the economy in steady state.
We now derive the symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium. In a symmetric equilib-
rium all agents of a given type behave equally. Then, market clearing in market 2 implies
q (!) ￿ qb (!) = (s=n)qs (!); ! 2 ￿; (16)
15while in the credit market it implies that all buyers receive a loan of size
lb (!) =
(1 ￿ n)[1 + ￿1 (!)=￿]M￿1
n
; ! 2 ￿: (17)
In any monetary equilibrium the buyer￿ s budget constraint must hold with equality in at
least one state. In these states we have
(n=￿)q (!)c
0 [(n=s)q (!)] = [1 + ￿1 (!)=￿]z: (18)
where z = ￿M is the real stock of money. It follows from (18) that in binding states
q (!;z) < q￿ (!) where q (!;z) is an increasing function of z. In non-binding states we have
q (!;z) = q￿ (!) where q￿ (!) solves (2).
Finally, use (4) to eliminate V m
1 and (16) to eliminate qs from (14). Then, multiply the












We can now de￿ne the equilibrium as the value of z that solves (19). The reason is that once
the equilibrium stock of money is determined all other endogenous variables can be derived.
De￿nition 1 A symmetric monetary stationary equilibrium is a z that satis￿es (19).
Before moving on to stabilization policy it is important to note that there are two nominal
interest rates in our model. First there is the interest rate paid on a riskless, one-period
nominal bond issued in market 3 and redeemed in the following market 3 (quasi-linearity
means the agents are risk neutral). Although such a bond is never traded we can price it and
its interest rate is given by 1+i3 = ￿=￿ = (1 + ￿)(1 + ￿) where ￿ is the steady-state in￿ ation
rate from market 3 to market 3 and ￿ is the time rate of discount. Thus the right-hand side
of (19) corresponds to this nominal interest rate. The second nominal interest rate in the
model is the state contingent rate occurring in the market 1 ￿nancial market, i(!). This is
16the nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank to stabilize the shocks. Thus, using





which is just an arbitrage condition between market 3 bonds and money. In short, by holding
a unit of money an agent gives up the ￿ long-term￿interest rate i3 but earns the expected
nominal interest rate i(!) in state ! in market 1 (either by depositing the unit of money if
its not needed or by avoiding having to borrow a unit of money in market 1). Thus, (19)
equates the nominal return of a market 3 bond to the expected nominal rate on a market 1
bond.
5 Stabilization Policy
The central bank￿ s objective is to maximize the welfare of the representative agent. It does
so by choosing the quantities consumed and produced in each state subject to the constraint
that the chosen quantities satisfy the conditions of a competitive equilibrium. The policy is
implemented by choosing state contingent injections ￿1 (!) and ￿3 (!) accordingly.
The primal Ramsey problem facing the central bank is
M￿x
q(!);x
U (x) ￿ x +
Z
￿
fn"u[q (!)] ￿ (s=￿)c[(n=s)q (!)]gf (!)d! (21)
s.t. (19);
where the constraint facing the central bank is that the quantities chosen must be compatible
with a competitive equilibrium. It is obvious that x = x￿ so all that remains is to choose
q (!).
Rather than doing a primal approach, conceptually we could use (12) to solve for q (!)
as a function of i(!) and the shocks. We would then substitute those expressions into (21)
to eliminate q (!). The central bank￿ s problem would then be to choose a menu of state
17contingent nominal interest rates in market 1 subject to the arbitrage constraint (20) that
the expected interest rate in market 1 is equal to the interest rate on a bond that trades
from market 3 to market 3. The central bank is assumed to take i3 as given.
Proposition 1 If ￿ = ￿, i3 = 0 and the optimal policy is i(!) = 0 with q (!) = q￿ (!) for
all states.
According to Proposition 1, if ￿ = ￿ is feasible, the central bank should implement the
Friedman rule i(!) = 0 for all states. For ￿ = ￿ the rate of return on money is equal to the
time rate of discount, implying prices in market 3 fall at the rate ￿, which is the discount
factor. In this case, agents can costlessly carry money across periods. Since the only friction
in our model is the cost of holding money across periods, the Friedman rule eliminates it.
So agents can perfectly self-insure against all consumption risk. Consequently, there are no
welfare gains from stabilization policies.11 Alternatively, if the central bank were allowed to
choose i3 it would set it to zero as well.
Now consider the case in which the central bank is constrained (for some reason) such
that ￿ > ￿ or i3 > 0. For this case we have the following result.
Proposition 2 If ￿ > ￿, i3 > 0 then the optimal policy is i(!) > 0 with q (!) < q￿ (!) for
all states.
According to Propositions 1 and 2, unless i(!) = 0 can be done for all states, it is optimal
to never set i(!) = 0. Hence, zero nominal interest rates should be an all-or-nothing policy.
This says that the zero lower bound is never an issue in our model ￿if ￿ = ￿ then it is
optimal to always be at the lower bound and if ￿ > ￿ its optimal to never hit the lower
bound.
Why does the central bank never choose i(!) = 0 for any state if ￿ > ￿? Whenever
￿ > ￿, i3 > 0 and so there is an implicit opportunity cost to carry money across periods.
11Ireland (1996) derives a similar result in a model with nominal price stickiness. He ￿nds that at the
Friedman rule there is no gain from stabilizing aggregate demand shocks.
18Consequently, agents economize on cash balances. In the absence of policy intervention,
this would imply that in some states, agents would have enough cash to buy the ￿rst-best
quantity of goods q￿ (!) while in other states, their cash holdings constrain their spending
such that q (!) < q￿ (!). This creates an ine¢ ciency of consumption across states that
stabilization policy can overcome. To see this, consider two states !;!0 2 ￿ with i(!) = 0
implying q (!) = q￿ (!) and i(!0) > 0 implying q (!0) < q￿ (!0). Then, the ￿rst-order loss
from decreasing q (!) is zero while there is a ￿rst-order gain from increasing q (!0). This gain
can be accomplished by increasing i(!) and lowering i(!0) such that the expected nominal
interest rate in market 21 is unchanged. Thus, the central bank￿ s optimal policy is to smooth
interest rates across states.
For the remainder of the paper, we will study the behavior of stabilization policy under
the condition that ￿ > ￿ and i3 > 0 in order to understand how the central bank responds
to the individual shocks.
6 Discussion
In this section we discuss how stabilization policy works in our economy and why stabiliza-
tion policy requires control of price expectations. We then explore the gains from optimal
stabilization by comparing the allocations under the optimal policy with the one when the
central bank is passive. Finally we discuss a benchmark with ￿sticky￿prices.
6.1 Liquidity and in￿ ation expectation e⁄ects
The optimal stabilization policy in our model works through a liquidity e⁄ect. For this e⁄ect
to operate, the central bank must control in￿ ation expectations by choosing a price path in
market 3. Without it, injections in the ￿rst market simply change price expectations and
the nominal interest rate as predicted by the Fisher equation.
Under our proposed policy, the money stock as measured at the end of market 3, grows
19at the rate Mt = ￿Mt￿1where ￿ > ￿ is ￿xed. In a stationary equilibrium, we assume that
real balances measure in market 3 prices is constant, ￿tMt = ￿t￿1Mt￿1 = z where z is state





Thus, by committing to this price path for prices in market 3, p3;t is pinned down by the
growth rate of the money stock and last period￿ s price. Hence, at the beginning of market
1 in period agents know what the price of goods will be at the end of the period. With
￿ > ￿, buyers will always be constrained by their real money balances, since the cost of
holding money is not zero. Combining (18), (22) and the expression above for p3;t yields the
quantities that can be purchased in market 2:
q (!) = (￿=n)[1 + ￿1 (!)=￿]M￿1=p3;￿1:
It is clear from this expression that the size of the monetary injection in market 1, ￿1 (!),
will a⁄ect the quantity of goods purchased even though market 2 prices are perfectly ￿ exible.
Why is this? In market 2, sellers accept money based on its purchasing power in market
3, which is when they will spend it. Thus any injection into market 1 that is unwound in
market 3 does not cause in￿ ation (￿ does not depend on ￿1 (!)). As a result, sellers are
willing to sell the same quantity at the existing market 2 price, p2, even though the nominal
money stock is higher in market 2. From the buyers￿point of view though, this implies that
real balances are higher in market 2 and thus they can acquire more goods.
Alternatively, one can think of this as a liquidity e⁄ect from the monetary injection. This
can be seen by substituting the expression for q (!) above into (12)
i(!) =
￿"u0 f(￿=n)[1 + ￿1 (!)=￿]M￿1=p3;￿1g
c0 f(￿=s)[1 + ￿1 (!)=￿]M￿1=p3;￿1g
￿ 1 > 0, ! 2 ￿: (22)
20For a given realization of shocks, the right-hand side of this expression is decreasing in ￿1 (!).
What is the intuition for this? If ￿1 (!) > 0 then the central bank is injecting liquidity into
market 1. This has two e⁄ects. First, buyers now have more real balances and need to
borrow less. Thus, the demand for loans declines. Second, sellers have more real balances
as well, which they deposit in the bank. This increases the supply of loans. As a result,
the nominal interest rate is bid down. Again, this only works because all agents expect this
injection to be unwound in market 3, leaving the real value of money in market 3 unchanged.
What happens if the central bank never undoes the state contingent injections of market
1? In this case ￿3 (!) = 0 for all t and ! 2 ￿. We can then state the following
Proposition 3 Assume that ￿3 (!) = 0 for all ! 2 ￿. Then, changes in ￿1 (!) have no real
e⁄ects and any stabilization policy is ine⁄ective.
If the central bank does not reverse the state contingent injections of the ￿rst market,
the price of goods in market 2 changes proportionately to changes in ￿1 (!). Consequently,
the real money holdings of the buyers are una⁄ected and consumption in market 2 does not
react to changes in ￿1 (!). Such a policy only a⁄ects the expected nominal interest rate. To
see this note that the gross growth rate of the money supply in this case is ￿t = ￿1 (!)+￿+1.
Then substitute this and (22) into the constraint of the central bank problem to get






An increase in ￿1 (!) increases the expected nominal interest rate. This is simply the in￿ ation
expectation e⁄ect from the Fisher equation.
An example To illustrate how the stabilization policy works when ￿ > ￿, consider a
simple example in which the only shock is the intensive margin demand shock ". Let " be
uniformly distributed and assume ￿" > 1: Preferences are u(q) = 1 ￿ exp￿q and c(q) = q.






where ￿ is multiplier on the constraint in (21). Substituting this expression in the central












Solving for ￿ and substituting back into (23) yields
q (") = ln￿" ￿ ln(￿=￿) = q
￿ (") ￿ ln(￿=￿); (24)





Note that this example generates perfect interest rate smoothing by the central bank. When
demand for goods (and loans) increases, the central bank accommodates this higher demand
by injecting funds into the market 1 ￿nancial market thereby keeping interest rates constant.
This allows buyers to consume more. While smoothing interest rates is a general property
of our model, perfect smoothing is a special case resulting from the functional forms used.
From the buyer￿ s budget constraint we have
q (") =
￿[￿ + ￿1 (")]z
n￿
: (25)
12With these utility and cost functions, the central bank￿ s second-order condition is satis￿ed.
13Since the Inada condition does not hold for this utility function q (") = 0 when ￿ = ￿￿": Thus for all
￿ ￿ ￿ < ￿￿" an equilibrium exists. For ￿ ￿ ￿￿" no monetary equilibrium exists.
22Since z is not state dependent, taking the ratios of (25) for all q (") relative to q (") gives
q (") =
1 + ￿1 (")=￿
1 + ￿1 (")=￿
q ("): (26)
Since the transfers are nominal objects, there is one degree of freedom in ￿1 (") so let ￿1 (") =
0. This implies that in the state in which buyers have the lowest demand for goods, the
central bank does not inject any cash. Thus
z = (n=￿)[ln￿" ￿ ln(￿=￿)]










> 1 for all " > ";
so ￿1 (") > 0 for all " > " and increasing in ". Thus, the higher is demand for goods, the
larger is the injection needed to ￿nance this increased consumption.
6.2 The ine¢ ciency of a passive policy
What are the ine¢ ciencies arising from a passive policy? In order to study this question we
now derive the allocation when the central bank follows a policy where the injections are
not state dependent, i.e., ￿1 (!) = ￿3 (!) = 0, and compare it to the central bank￿ s optimal
allocation. We do so under the assumption that ￿ > ￿ or i3 > 0. The fact that the central
bank is assumed to generate an in￿ ation rate above that predicted by the Friedman rule
is intended to capture various constraints on the central bank￿ s ability to de￿ ate, such as
seigniorage concerns, in￿ ation targets etc. Our main objective is to better understand how
the optimal stabilization a⁄ects the allocation across states relative to doing nothing.14
14Two comments are in order. First, a more thorough analysis should explain why ￿ > ￿ is not a policy
choice of the central bank. Many have aruged that if ￿ < 1 then the central bank must resort to lump-sum
taxation to extract money from the economy. If may be the case that the institutional structure does not
allow taxation by the central bank. Hence, studing the case with ￿ ￿ 1 > ￿ is a re￿ ection of this. Second, if
23Extensive margin demand shocks For the analysis of shocks to n, we assume that ￿,
" and s are constant. Note that the ￿rst-best quantity q￿ (n) is non-increasing in n.
Proposition 4 For ￿ ￿ 1, a unique monetary equilibrium exists with q = q￿ (n) if n ￿ ~ n
and q < q￿ (n) if n > ~ n, where ~ n 2 (0;n]. Moreover, d~ n=d￿ < 0:
With a passive policy buyers are constrained when there are many borrowers (high n)
and are unconstrained when there are many creditors (low n). Since d~ n=d￿ < 0, the higher is
the in￿ ation rate, the larger is the range of shocks where the quantity traded is ine¢ ciently
low. Note that for large ￿ we can have ~ n ￿ n which implies that q < q￿ (n) in all states.
How does this allocation di⁄er from the one obtained by following an active policy? We
illustrate the di⁄erences in Figure 1 for a linear cost function. The curve labelled ￿Passive
q￿represents equilibrium consumption under a passive policy and the curve labelled ￿Active
q￿consumption when the central bank behaves optimally.
As shown earlier, with an active policy buyers never consume q￿, and with linear cost the
central bank wants q to be increasing in n.15 This is just the opposite from what happens
when the central bank is passive. With a passive policy, buyers consume q = q￿ in low n
states and q < q￿ in high n states. Moreover, q is strictly decreasing in n for n > ~ n. These
di⁄erences are also re￿ ected in the nominal interest rates. With an active policy the nominal
interest rate is strictly positive in all states and decreasing in n. In contrast, with a passive
policy the nominal interest rate is i = 0 for n ￿ ~ n and i = "￿u0 (q) ￿ 1 ￿ 0 for n > ~ n, and
increasing in n.
￿ > ￿; then ￿scal policy could be used to provide a state-contingent production subsidy ￿nanced by lump-
sum taxation in market 3 to eliminate any distortions. It is debatable whether this type of state-contingent
￿scal policy is more feasible than state-contingent monetary policy in practice as is the use of lump-sum
taxes. Furthermore, if distortionary taxation is used, then it may be optimal to set ￿ > ￿ yet have a
production subsidy that does not eliminate the distortion caused by ￿ > ￿ (see Aruoba and Chugh (2008)).
In this case, our results would go through.










i = 0 i > 0
Figure 1: Shocks to the number of buyers.
What is the role of the credit market? With a linear cost function and no credit market,
the quantities consumed are the same across all n-states since buyers can only spend the
cash they bring into market 1, which is independent of the state that is realized. In contrast,
with a credit market, idle cash is lent out to buyers. This makes individual consumption
higher on average but also more volatile. The reason is that when n is high demand for
loans is high and the supply of loans is low. This pushes up the nominal interest rate and
decreases individual consumption. The opposite occurs when n is low.
Intensive margin demand shocks To study " shocks we assume that ￿, n and s are
constant. It then follows that ! = ". Note that the ￿rst-best quantity q￿ (") is strictly
increasing in ".
Proposition 5 For ￿ ￿ 1, a unique monetary equilibrium exists with q < q￿ (") for " > ~ "
and q = q￿ (") for " < ~ ", where ~ " 2 [0;￿ "]. Moreover, d~ "=d￿ < 0.
With a passive policy, buyers are constrained in high marginal utility states but not in
low states. If ￿ is su¢ ciently high, buyers are constrained in all states. Note that with a
25passive policy dq=d" > 0 for " ￿ ~ " and dq=d" = 0 for " > ~ ". For " ￿ ~ ", buyers have more
than enough real balances to buy the e¢ cient quantity. So when " increases, they simply
spend more of their money balances. For " > ~ ", buyers are constrained. So when " increases,
the demand for loans increases but the supply of loans is unchanged so no additional loans









i > 0 i = 0
Passive q
Figure 2: Marginal utility shocks.
Figure 2 illustrates how the allocation resulting from a passive policy di⁄ers from the one
obtained under an active policy. The dashed curve represents the ￿rst-best quantities q￿ (").
The curve labelled ￿Passive q￿represents equilibrium consumption under a passive policy
and the curve labelled ￿Active q￿consumption when the central bank behaves optimally.
The central bank￿ s optimal choice is strictly increasing in " for any cost function.
Finally, we have also derived the equilibrium under a passive policy for the extensive, s,
and the intensive, ￿, supply shocks. The results and ￿gures are qualitatively the same and
we therefore do not present them here. They typically involve a cuto⁄ value such that the
nominal interest rate is zero either above or below this value. These derivations are available
by request.
267 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where
money is essential for trade and prices are fully ￿ exible. Our main result is that if the
central bank engages in price-level targeting, it can successfully stabilize short-run aggregate
shocks to the economy and improve welfare. By adopting a price level target, the central
bank is able to manage in￿ ation expectations, which enables it to pursue welfare improving
stabilization policies. If it does not adhere to the targeting price path, stabilization attempts
are ine⁄ective. Monetary injections simply raise price expectations and the nominal interest
rate as predicted by the Fisher equation. By adhering to the targeted price path, the optimal
policy works through a liquidity e⁄ect ￿the central bank reduces the nominal interest rate
via monetary injections to expand consumption and output.
There are many extensions of this model that would be interesting to pursue. For exam-
ple, why would the optimal monetary policy involve ￿ > ￿? Existing search theoretic models
of money suggest there may be a trade-o⁄between the extensive and intensive margins that
induces the central bank to create anticipated in￿ ation.16 Another issue is to assess the
behavior of the model quantitatively. In short, what are the welfare gains from stabilizing
shocks? Furthermore, as our example showed, nominal interest rate smoothing may be opti-
mal. This stands in contrast to many New Keynesian models whereby the nominal interest
rate is quite volatile. Thus, it would be interesting to see what a fully calibrated version of
our model predicts for the volatility of the nominal interest rate. We leave these questions
for future research.
16Berentsen and Waller (2009) pursue this issue and show that the central bank may not choose ￿ = ￿
under the optimal policy.
27Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From (21) the unconstrained optimum corresponds to q = q￿ (!)
for all ! = ￿. From the constraint of the central bank problem, since ￿ < ￿ is not feasible,
the only value that is consistent with the unconstrained optimum is ￿ = ￿.
Proof of Proposition 2. The ￿rst-order conditions for the central bank are
n"u
0 [q (!)] ￿ (n=￿)c









Note that ￿ is independent of !. Su¢ cient conditions for a maximum are
￿"u
00 [q (!)] ￿ (n=s)c
00 [(n=s)q (!)] ￿ f￿"u
0 [q (!)] ￿ c
0 [(n=s)q (!)]g￿(!) < 0;
where
￿(!) =
u000 [q (!)]c0 [(n=s)q (!)] ￿ (n=s)
2 c000 [(n=s)q (!)]u0 [q (!)]




for all ! 2 ￿. The rest of the proof immediately follows from inspecting the ￿rst-order
conditions (27).
Proof of Proposition 3. In any equilibrium buyers￿money holdings are
M￿1 [1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)] + lb (!) =






since the end-of-period nominal money stock is M (!) = M￿1 [1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)]. Thus, in any




; ! 2 ￿.
The ￿rst-order conditions of the sellers (6) imply
￿
￿1c
0 [(n=s)q (!)]q (!) ￿
￿(!)M (!)
n
; ! 2 ￿.
In a steady-state equilibrium ￿(!)M (!) = ￿￿1 (!)M￿1 (!) = z (!) for all ! 2 ￿. Hence,
￿
￿1c
0 [(n=s)q (!)]q (!) ￿
z (!)
n
; ! 2 ￿. (28)
We now show that in any stationary equilibrium z (!) = z is a constant. Use (4) to eliminate
V m






0 [(n=s)q (!)]gf (!)d!:
Multiply this expression by M￿1 (!￿1) to get










since M (!) = [1 + ￿ + ￿1 (!)]M￿1 (!￿1) = ￿ (!)M￿1 (!￿1). Note that in any steady-state
equilibrium the right-hand side is independent of !￿1 and therefore a constant. This im-
mediately implies that M￿1 (!￿1)￿￿1 (!￿1) = z￿1 is constant for all !￿1 2 ￿. Since in a






￿ (!)c0 [(n=s)q (!)]
￿
f (!)d!:
29Finally from (28) we have
￿
￿1c
0 [(n=s)q (!)]q (!) ￿
z
n
; ! 2 ￿.
Since the right-hand side is independent of ￿ (!), changes is ￿ (!) are neutral. Hence,
stabilization policy is ine⁄ective.
We use Lemma 1 in the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5.
Lemma 1 Under e¢ cient trading, real aggregate spending n￿p(!)q￿ (!) is increasing in ".
It is increasing in n and decreasing in s and ￿ if







Proof of Lemma 1. In equilibrium buyer￿ s real money holdings are (￿=n)z = z=n since
￿ = 1 with a passive policy. Thus, in any equilibrium n￿pq ￿ z. The right-hand side is the
aggregate real money stock in market 1 which is independent of !. The left-hand side is
real aggregate spending measured in market 3 prices which is a function of !. For a given
state !, trades are e¢ cient if n￿p(!)q￿ (!) ￿ z and ine¢ cient if n￿p(!)q￿ (!) > z where
p = p(!) is a function of ! but ￿ is not. We would like to know how real aggregate spending
g (!) = n￿p(!)q￿ (!) changes in ! when trades are e¢ cient:
dg (!) = ￿p(!)q
￿ (!)dn + n￿q
￿ (!)dp + n￿p(!)dq
￿:
The ￿rst term re￿ ects the change in real liquidity that is intermediated in the economy. This
e⁄ect only occurs if n changes. The second term re￿ ects changes in the relative price ￿p of
goods and the third term changes in the e¢ cient quantity. Rewrite it as follows























































































￿"u00 (q￿) ￿ c00 [(n=s)q￿](n=s)
> 0:
Proof of Proposition 4. Here ! = n.














@n ￿ 0. If g (n) > z, then agents are constrained in all states. If g (n) < z,
then agents are never constrained. If g (n) ￿ z ￿ g (n), for a given value of z there is a
unique critical value ~ n such that
g (~ n) = z: (30)
This implies that q = q￿ (n) for n ￿ ~ n and q < q￿ (n) for n > ~ n. Note that @~ n
@z ￿ 0.











f (n)dn ￿ RHS; (31)
where ￿ n = maxf~ n;ng. Only the right-hand side is a function of z. Note that lim
z!0RHS = 1.
For z = g (n) we have ~ n = n and therefore RHS jz=z = 0 ￿
￿￿￿
￿ . Since RHS is continuous
in z an equilibrium exists.
Uniqueness: The right-hand side of (31) is monotonically decreasing in z. To see this














￿"u0 [q (￿ n;z)]


















f (n)dn < 0:
Since the right-hand side is decreasing in z, we have a unique z that solves (31). Consequently,
we have
q = q
￿ (n) if n ￿ ￿ n and q < q
￿ (n) otherwise.
Hours worked: Finally, if buyers have been constrained in market 1 money holdings at
the opening of the third market are m3 = pqs for sellers m3 = 0 for non-sellers. Solving for
equilibrium consumption and production in the third market, with x￿ = U0￿1 (1), gives
hb = x
￿ + nec (q)c[(n=s)q] + (1 ￿ n)eu (q)u(q)
hs = x
￿ ￿ nec (q)c[(n=s)q](1 ￿ s)s
￿1 ￿ neu (q)u(q)
ho = x
￿ + nec (q)c[(n=s)q] ￿ neu (q)u(q):
32Notice that nhb +shs +(1 ￿ n ￿ s)ho = x￿. Moreover, we have hb ￿ ho ￿ hs. For existence
we need that all agents work a positive amount in the third market. This, it is su¢ cient to
show that hs > 0.
Given s > 0, n=s is bounded and since the elasticities ec (q) and eu (q) are bounded, we
can scale U(x) such that there is a value x￿ = U0￿1 (1) greater than the last term for all
q 2 [0;q￿]. Hence, hs is positive for for all q 2 [0;q￿] ensuring that the equilibrium exists.
Note that the states where the buyers are constrained are the ones where the sellers have all
the money after trading. Therefore, if hs is positive in constrained states it is positive in all
unconstrained states.
Proof of Proposition 5. Here ! = ".














@" ￿ 0. If g (") > z, then agents are constrained in all states. If g (") < z,
then agents are never constrained. If g (") ￿ z ￿ g ("), for a given value of z there is a
unique critical value ~ " such that
g (~ ") = z: (33)
This implies that q = q￿ (") for " ￿ ~ " and q < q￿ (") for " > ~ ". Note that @~ "
@z ￿ 0.











f (")d" ￿ RHS; (34)
where ￿ " = maxf~ ";"g. Only the right-hand side is a function of z. Note that lim
z!0RHS = 1.
For z = g (") we have ~ " = " and therefore RHS jz=z = 0 ￿
￿￿￿
￿ . Since RHS is continuous
in z an equilibrium exists.
Uniqueness: The right-hand side of (34) is monotonically decreasing in z. To see this













f (")d" < 0:
Since the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in z, we have a unique z that solves (34).
Consequently, we have
q = q
￿ (") if " ￿ ￿ " and q < q
￿ (") otherwise.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that the hours worked in market 3 are bounded away
from zero.
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